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Abstract
King and Lenox (2001) argued that “when does it pay to be green” might be a more
important question for firms than whether it pays at all. We present an event study that
suggests that it pays in the tangible presence of regulatory pressure, depending on how well
the chosen scheme to become green fits with the threatened regulatory design. To this end,
we exploit the unexpected passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009. This bill came as
a surprise and brought the US economy on the brink of a nationwide CO2 emission trad-
ing system. We use this event to study whether firms with memberships in two well-known
voluntary environmental programs to curb carbon emission, the Chicago Climate Exchange
and the Climate Leaders, were rewarded by the stock market when the likelihood of fed-
eral legislation targeting carbon emissions suddenly increased. To complement the picture,
we examine the prior market response to membership announcements. As yet, empirical
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evidence on both issues does not present a coherent picture. We unravel the intricacies by
standardizing the statistical methods and integrating the datasets. Our results suggest that
only membership in tailored programs is considered beneficial. Crucially, a substantial part
of the market reaction consists of industry-wide effects. In contrast to previous findings,
we find no evidence that mere membership announcements triggers a market reaction. Our
findings shed light on investors’ expectations of climate change policies and their value
perception of voluntary carbon reduction programs.
2
1 Introduction
The latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change once again
stresses the critical impact of CO2 emissions on the environment. Still, it does not seem likely
that an agreement on a global framework to tackle climate change is achieved anytime soon.
Notably the United States as the leading nation in greenhouse gas emissions lacks federal legis-
lations that address carbon emissions on firm level. 1 Neither did any signs credibly point into
that direction until 26 June 2009, when the US House of Representatives narrowly passed H.R.
2454: The ”American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009”. Dubbed the Waxman-Markey
Bill, this act aimed to cap CO2 emissions in the US by means of an emission trading system.
The passage of this bill caught the public off guard. Even though the Senate eventually defeated
the bill later on, its success in the House of Representatives unexpectedly and substantially
increased the likelihood of federal carbon legislation in the US.
Some firms seemed prepared in light of this looming change in legislation. Apart from
signaling credibility and commitment, voluntary (but nevertheless binding) environmental ini-
tiatives provide a learning environment to improve one’s corporate footprint. With the goal
to curb CO2 emissions in the US, two initiatives launched in the early 2000s stand out. The
Climate Leaders (CL) program was an industry-government partnership to help firms reduce
emissions of six major greenhouse gases. Participating members pledged to a realistic reduc-
tion goal within a five to ten year timeframe. The second initiative could be considered a direct
predecessor of the government-based emission trading system intended by theWaxman-Markey
Bill. The so-called Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) was a trade platform forCO2 certificates.
Its members agreed to a reduction goal and independent verification of their efforts.
Against this background, this paper addresses two questions. First, it asks whether being
prepared for CO2 regulation pays off for firms. More precisely, we employ an event study to
analyze whether corporate membership in the CCX or CL initiative was immediately rewarded
by the financial markets in view of the unanticipated rise of likelihood of federal legislation. If
this is the case, one motivation for firms to join such voluntary programs might be preparation
for regulation. On that note, Bruce Braine, vice president of strategic policy analysis for Amer-
ican Electric Power described the motivation to participate in the CCX as follows: “Many of
us were doing this not only to make voluntary commitments, but as a way that we could get
prepared for a mandatory future. [. . . ] We were learning the ropes, learning about trading and
trying to become more proficient in reducing our carbon footprint over time.” We are not the
first to exploit this event. A similar study by Gans and Hintermann (2013) comes to the conclu-
sion that, evaluated on a monthly basis, the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill was associated
1There are regional efforts, e.g.: California has recently introduced a cap-and-trade program. However, the
large number of allocated pollution permits weigh heavy on their price. Other initiatives encompass several states.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative aims to reduce greenhouse gases in nine US states in the northeast and is
limited to large fossil fuel power plants.
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with positive returns for CCX firms. 2
The second question this paper tackles is how, if at all, the mere announcement to join a
voluntary environmental initiative is gaged by the stock market. Existing empirical evidence
is ambiguous. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn’s (2011) event study analyzes the immediate stock
market reactions for firms announncing their membership to the CL program. In the seeming
absence of regulatory pressure, these firms were vigorously penalized in terms of falling stock
prices. These results give reason to believe that engagement in voluntary programs are perceived
as detrimental from an investor’s point of view. On the other hand, investors might perceive
voluntary carbon reduction programs as a fitting training ground for an expected mandatory
carbon market. In this case, stock market reactions in light of an abrupt increase in the likelihood
of legislation should be favorable. Other empirical evidence is consistent with this view. In
their study, Gans and Hintermann (2013) come to the conclusion that the stock market reacted
favorably towards firms announcing membership to the CCX.
At first glance, this contradicting evidence seems puzzling. We argue that the ambigu-
ity hinges on two issues. For one, test statistics of short-horizon event studies (like the one
in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn) are better specified than those of long-horizon event studies
because they are less sensitive to the benchmark model of normal returns and issues of cross-
sectional or time-series dependence of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). Gans
and Hintermann (2013) employ a difference-in-differences framework on a monthly basis when
evaluating the effects of membership announcements and the Waxman-Markey Bill on CCX
firms. Their results are highly instructive, but the approach is rather unusual in the context
of unexpected events. The large time window associated with monthly data and particularly
the lack of consideration for confounding events gives pause. Brown and Warner (1980), for
instance, document the problem of using monthly data by illustrating that the degree of misspec-
ification in event tests can be severe. And in a well-known replication study, McWilliams and
Siegel (1997) highlight the importance of accounting for such confoundings. In other words, it
is not clear to what extent the identified positive return effect for the CCX firms in Gans and
Hintermann is attributable to the two events in question, the membership announcements and
the Waxman-Markey Bill. By the same token, it would be illuminating to know how CL firms,
in addition to their negative reaction upon membership announcement, fared during the passing
of the Waxman-Markey Bill. The structure of the CCX program differs substantially from the
CL initiative and relies heavily on a market mechanism to curb CO2 emissions. Does the con-
flicting evidence on membership announcements for the CCX and the CL initiative translate to
the Waxman-Markey Bill? A comparison of the two programs in light of the Bill would yield
complementary evidence about the value perception of voluntary initiatives in critical times.
This paper reconciles the existing findings and contributes to a more comprehensive picture.
We fill two explanatory gaps and highlight the role of industry-wide effects . First, we add to the
conclusiveness of the statistical inference on the effects of both membership announcement and
2National Geographic, daily news, November 3 2010
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the Waxman-Markey Bill on CCX members. The surprising nature of these events lends itself
exceptionally well to conducting an event study. Our second contribution consists in the direct
comparison of two distinct initiatives for both events. To this end, we extend the analysis of the
impact of the Waxman-Markey Bill to CL firms. This extension yields complementary evidence
to the preparation argument. Since the market deemed the value of becoming a member in
these two programs differently, we might also observe disparate market reactions in light of the
Waxman-Markey Bill. In particular, an environmental program that is tailored to the specific
threat of future regulation by means of a cap-and-trade system is likely to be a more effective
tool to mediate the effect of an according shock. Put differently, we would expect the CCX
cap-and-trade program to receive more goodwill from the market during the passage of the Bill.
Our results are in line with this argument. Conservative estimates suggest that stock prices
of CCX members experienced on average positive abnormal returns of 0.7 percent during the
passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill. CL members, on the other hand, hardly provoked any
significant market reaction. Our analysis suggests that industry-wide market reactions play
an important role when evaluating suddenly looming environmental costs. When analyzing
the impact of the bill, it turns out that these industry effects explain a substantial part of the
observed reaction for the CCX firms and fully absorb the effect that is otherwise attributable
to CL membership. Finally, our event study finds no measurable market reaction for firms
announcing membership to the CCX. This qualifies previous findings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides background infor-
mation on the Waxman-Markey Bill, the two voluntary environmental programs in our sample,
and the related literature. Section 3 lays out the event study methodology, followed by the de-
scription of our data in Section 4. The results of the two event studies are presented in Section
5, and the last section concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Waxman-Markey
H.R. 2454, the ”American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009” was a bill to propose,
among other things, the introduction of a cap and trade system. The bill, also known as the
Waxman-Markey Bill, was to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases in the United States,
in particular CO2. Remaining the last industrialized country solely oriented towards voluntary
programs, the bill was to replace existing voluntary action with mandatory legislation. Under
the new legislation, over the next 40 years carbon emissions would be increasingly capped up
to 83% of 2005 levels. Allocated with certain CO2 allowances, the regulated firms would be
free to trade their pollution rights at market prices. Although constituting the most prominent
element of the legislation, the contents of the bill extend beyond the cap-and-trade system. It
was a comprehensive policy to address climate change. As such, it included requirements of
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”creating a combined energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard and requiring retail
electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their demand through renewable electricity and electricity
savings by 2020” and ”setting a goal of, and requiring a strategic plan for, improving overall
U.S. energy productivity by at least 2.5% per year by 2012 and maintaining that improvement
rate through 2030”.3
After months of negotiations, on Friday June 26 2009 at 7:17 p.m. the House of Represen-
tatives passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 212. The outcome remained uncertain to the end and
stirred up subsequent emotions, pointing towards a controversial and unforeseen decision. The
media response proclaimed the legislation as historic for the United States and a victory for the
Obama administration. Although it remained to be seen whether the Senate would approve the
bill as well, the decision in the House of Representatives left the country stunned and raised
questions about the immediate impact on the economy. For some time, there was good reason
to believe that firms would face substantial costs in terms of CO2 reduction efforts in the near
future.
2.2 Chicago Climate Exchange and Climate Leaders
Two major initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the US were launched roughly ten
years ago. In 2003, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) started trading operations of the
first cap-and-trade system in North America with 13 charter members that made voluntary but
legally binding commitments to reduce six different types of greenhouse gas emissions.4 By
definition, the exchange was characterized by a market mechanism, a platform where prices
were considered and allowances exchanged, and where strategic interaction took place. As part
of its cap-and-trade scheme the CCX relied on a carbon offset program with its own standards
for allowances and offset credits, called “Carbon Financial Instrument” contracts. Established
emission baselines and emission reports were verified independently. The CCX was character-
ized by two distinct phases. From 2003 to 2006 members had to cut their emissions annually by
1% bellow their baseline average defined as from 1998 to 2001. In the second phase from 2007
to 2010, existing members had to cut emissions annually by 0.5% while new members had to
cut emissions by 1.5%.
The CCX was characterized by a comprehensive market structure with different partici-
pants. Apart from the direct emitters, the CCX members, there were associate members, offset
providers, liquidity providers and exchange participants. Overall, the exchange had around 400
members with annual membership fees ranging from 1,000-60,000 USD5, depending on firm
size and membership type. In November 2010, the CCX announced that it would cease its
operation, arguing that firms were no longer interested in trading emission credits in the ab-
3http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2454, visited on October 9 2012
4CCX Fact Sheet, December 2011. https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/ccx/CCX_Fact_
Sheet.pdf, visited on January 14 2013
5http://co2offsetresearch.org/policy/CCX.html, visited on December 20 2012
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sence of government legislation (Financial Times). The low price of CO2 emission allowances
indicates that the firms’ emission reduction targets were not very stringent and that therefore
firms expected and indeed did over comply with their commitments. A further source of the
cheap emission allowances might also be the criticized weak additionality requirement of CCX
(Kollmuss et al., 2008).
The Climate Leaders Greenhouse Gas Inventory Protocol (CL) is the second voluntary ini-
tiative we study. Formed in 2002, the initiative was based on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol
developed by the World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development. The CL covered six major greenhouse gas emissions categorized into direct
emissions (known as Scope 1), indirect emissions (known as Scope 2), and offered the reduc-
tion of optional emissions (known as Scope 3). Climate Leaders was an industry-government
partnership initiated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that worked with com-
panies to develop comprehensive climate change strategies. Upon becoming a partner, the EPA
assisted the company in developing inventory and inventory management plans. Partners then
set a corporate-wide domestic or global five to ten year greenhouse gas reduction goal and
reported annual inventory data to EPA. In addition, partners were to document their progress to-
wards the goal (Tonkonogy and Oliva, 2007). Members did not only profit form EPA’s technical
assistance but EPA guaranteed also publicity for the members.
Four types of reduction goals were eligible for CL members: absolute, normalized, indexed,
or carbon neutrality. Upon engagement, the EPA evaluated the proposed reduction goals from
all partners, requiring an aggressive reduction compared to the projected GHG performance of
the sector. Partners were also allowed to develop their own mitigation offset projects or pur-
chase certified mandatory or voluntary GHG reductions, provided that the projects adhered to
approved EPA methodologies. In contrast to the CCX, there were no explicit market mecha-
nisms at work. Upon joining, it was not rational decision-making based on market prices that
influenced the daily carbon business. According to the EPA, partners were sure to receive high
level recognition via participating in meetings, public outreach, or press events (Tonkonogy
and Oliva, 2007). On September 15 2010, the EPA announced their decision to shut down the
program in light of new developments in regulatory and voluntary initiatives.
2.3 Related Literature
To an economist, voluntary participation in these two initiatives may seem puzzling at first
glance. Traditional economic analysis assumes that firms already behave optimally, with pol-
lution being an inevitable side product of production (Cropper and Oates, 1992). Reducing
production voluntarily thus moves in lockstep with lower use of input, pushing the firm away
from optimal production. Some critics, however, counter that it is questionable whether firms
make optimal use of inputs in the first place and see room for improvement. This discussion
has become popular as the ”engergy efficiency gap”. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) suggest
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that the paradigm of efficient energy consumption does not seem too far-fetched, but their con-
clusion does not seem final (Nadel and Therese, 2012). In this sense, membership in voluntary
initiatives might be helpful for optimal input allocation.
It turns out that one can explain voluntary participation in a number of other ways. The
literature identifies a variety of rational motives, some of which are based on some sort of
imperfect markets (for an overview, see Khanna, 2002). The motives can be roughly divided
into market motives and political motives (Fleckinger and Glachant, 2011). Let us first discuss
market motives.
Consumers with preferences for environmental friendly products may encourage product
differentiation (Baron, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). A firm
can convey its inclination towards green consumers more credibly if it joins an initiative that
verifies the according pledges independently. To this end, membership in voluntary initiatives
could serve as a signaling device. The financial market could harbor another catalyst for green
behavior. If there is pressure (or better yet, incentive) for green engagement from investors,
some firms could be at an advantage. Acclaimed green firms in the limelight of green investors
might benefit from lower capital costs caused by sub-optimal diversification (Heinkel et al.,
2001; Merton, 1987). In turn, this benefit creates an incentive for polluting firms to go green
(Baron, 2008). Disentangling the entity of the firm opens up the door to a different kind of
benefit from membership in voluntary initiatives. From a corporate governance perspective, a
firm might not seek to cater exclusively to its principals, the shareholders. Instead of acting in
the interest of the principal, the firm’s manager as the agent aims to maximize his or her own
utility function. Tirole (2001) highlights this crucial relationship between shareholder interest
and managerial incentive. These mismatched interests can explain green ventures if the manager
draws particular utility from doing so, say, by improving his personal status. Yet other market
motives include cost-cutting (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Bloom et al., 2010) or attracting
particularly apt employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008).
Political motives constitute the second branch of reasons to go green. Lyon and Maxwell
(2003) purport that that by participating in voluntary environmental initiatives, firms seek to
pre-empt or shape future public policies. On this note, perhaps the most pertinent argument that
rationalizes voluntary participation in our analysis is preparation for some expected legislation.
There might be reason to believe that with a non-negligible probability, future environmental
legislation will impose costly regulation upon firms. If so, it is reasonable to dampen the impact
of such a future shock by adjusting the behavior today and prepare voluntarily. For a smooth
path towards the expected extent of the regulation entails lower overall costs than a sudden ad-
justment. In contrast, then, to the corporate governance argument, voluntary green engagement
is consistent with shareholder value maximization. Unexpected changes in legislation open up
a possibility to test this hypothesis. If the markets correctly interprets the impact of suddenly
looming legislation, we should observe immediate changes in certain stock prices, plausibly
with some firms being affected more than others.
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There is empirical evidence that supports the view that a sudden increase in the likelihood
of future regulation is taken into account by the market. For instance, Bowen et al. (1983) and
Hill and Schneeweis (1983) suggest that the nuclear incident at the Three Mile Island facility
in 1979 affected the investors’ perception of future regulation by resulting in a sudden drop in
share prices for electric utility firms, in particular those who were invested in nuclear power.
The chemical disaster in Bhopal in 1984 had a similar effect. Once the extent of the tragedy
became clear, the market seemingly anticipated tighter regulation for the entire chemical indus-
try (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). Unexpected policy changes are likely to affect shareholder
value as well. The sudden proposal by President George Bush in 1989 to revise the Clean
Air Act triggered a drop in share prices for notoriously polluting firms (Freedman and Patten,
2004). And very recently, the unexpected reaction of the German government to the Fukushima
incident affected energy companies’ shareholder wealth (Betzer et al., 2013).
By and large, it is fair to assume that anticipated regulation is considered an impending
threat by the market. Yet some firms seem to fare better in harsh times. There is reason to
believe that voluntary engagement and subsequent verified disclosure is rewarded by the mar-
ket because of the informational value it delivers when actually facing external shocks. For
example, (more extensively) disclosing firms were at an advantage after the chemical leak in
Bhopal (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). The same held true after the sudden legislation in the
US in 1986 to handle contaminated sites (Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997). And firms that
were part of the Carbon Disclosure Project experienced an increase in shareholder value when
Russia unexpectedly ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 (Kim and Lyon, 2011). Much like the
Waxman-Markey Bill, these events qualify as external shocks which increased the likelihood
for environmental regulation.
There are two studies that address the value of membership in voluntary environmental ini-
tiatives and which are directly related to our paper. The event study by Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn (2011) investigates the announcement effects for firms joining the Climate Lead-
ers program as well as the more vaguely defined Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (CERES). While Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn do not discover any significant mar-
ket reaction for joining CERES, they find negative abnormal returns for announcing member-
ship in the CL program. On the day of the announcement, stock market returns of respective
firms performed one percent worse than expected. Moreover, announcing a binding CO2 target
incurred an additional penalty of 1.1 percent. One characteristic among the CL firms is con-
sistent with the mentioned corporate government argument to go green. The data show that
firms are more likely to join the CL program if they exhibit hostile shareholder governance. It
therefore seems likely that the market associated the announcements with the managers’ discre-
tionary leeway, which was not in the firms’ interests.
The second paper that directly relates to our work is the aforementioned study by Gans and
Hintermann (2013). Gans and Hintermann investigate stock returns of member firms of the
Chicago Climate Exchange on a monthly basis. Contrary to the CL firms in Fisher-Vanden and
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Thorburn, they find significant positive abnormal returns for firms announcing their member-
ship to the CCX. In addition, Gans and Hintermann take a look at the financial impact of the
Waxman-Markey Bill on CCX firms and find a positive market reaction. There are method-
ological drawbacks, however. The large time frame makes it difficult to isolate the effect of the
Waxman-Markey Bill. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that the impact of the Waxman-
Markey Bill was not screened for confounding events at the firm level during the same time
frame. We address these issues and extend their analysis. Our paper follows the event study
methodology applied in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn and provides comprehensive results of
the impacts of membership announcement for CCX firms on the one hand and the Waxman-
Markey Bill for both CCX and CL firms on the other hand. In doing so, the results benefit from
higher explanatory power. The next section briefly exposits the event study methodology and
highlights its advantage for causal inference.
3 Methodology
Event studies have become an indispensable tool in econometrics. MacKinlay (1997) gives a
comprehensive overview of the history, theory, and application of event studies in economics.
Event studies use financial market information (often stock prices) to deduce the effect of a
specific event on the value of a firm. This approach has the advantage that the causal chain is
isolated. The event has a direct impact on the stock price, similar to a treatment effect. The sta-
tistical inference in an event study relies on three assumptions (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997):
Market efficiency, a lack of confounding effects during the event window, and underestimation
or no anticipation of the event. Indeed, if the event in question was already anticipated and
provided, investors would have already had priced in its predicted impact on firm value. While
the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill was not out of the question, there is empirical evidence
that it was indeed largely unexpected and provided the market with new information (Meng,
2013).
The measurement of the impact is carried out by calculating the so-called abnormal stock
return. The abnormal return (AR) is the observed return minus the normal return during a
specified event window, where the normal return is the return that one would expect to occur
if the event had not taken place. The abnormal return ARiτ is given by equation 1, where
E(Riτ |Xτ ) is the expectation of return Riτ given Xτ .
ARiτ = Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ ) (1)
In financial economics, the normal return is often modeled via the market model, which
relates the return of interest Riτ to the market return Rmτ . In a nutshell, the market model
isolates the fraction of the return that is associated with the market return, rendering the return
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of interest more informative. The parameter estimates of the market model are calculated in an
Ordinary Least Square framework on the basis of a preceding estimation window. In addition to
the market return, our specification additionally employs the Fama-French’s ”small minus big”
(SMB) and ”high minus low” (HML) factors on a daily basis as explanatory variables (Fama
and French, 1992, 1993). Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) illustrate that this specification achieves
the highest reduction of residual cross-correlation. Taken together, we estimate the following
model specifications:
Riτ = αi + βi1 ·Rmτ + βi1 · SMBτ + βi2 ·HMLτ + ǫiτ (2)
Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HML+ β4i · ESretjt + ǫiτ (3)
Riτ = αi + β1i ·Rmτ + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HML+ β4i · BSretγt + ǫiτ (4)
SMB In equation 2 denotes the daily difference of a portfolio of small and big firms, and
HML indicates the daily difference of a portfolio of low and high book to market value firms. 6
ǫiτ is the remaining error term after estimating E(Riτ |Xτ ) and follows from ǫiτ = ARiτ =
Riτ − E(Riτ |Xτ ) via equation 1. We call the model specified in equation 2 the 3 factor
model or the baseline specification. We extend this specification by adding industry return
factors ESretjt and BSretγt in equation 3 and 4 respectively to control for industry effects. In
ESretjt, j denotes one of 10 economic sectors and in BUSretγt, γ denotes one of 25 business
sectors according to the Thomson Reuters Business Classification.
The event takes place after the estimation window and is usually placed inside the so-called
event window, during which the observed returns are compared to the expected ones. Because
some events cannot be unambiguously dated, for example due to gradual information leakage
or potential insider information, researchers often include several days around the official date
τ = 0. However, this comes at a cost. A longer time series of ARiτ diminishes the power of
the test statistics and tends to increase the number of confounding events. Not to mention that
a longer event window is difficult to reconcile with the notion of market efficiency. Contrary
to long-horizon event studies, the test statistics of short-horizon event studies are generally less
sensitive to the benchmark model of normal returns and issues of both cross-sectional and time-
series dependence of abnormal returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007).
In our data, Riτ is the total return index based on closing prices. The closing price of day
τ − 1 is the opening price of day τ . In the event window notation [T2, T3], T2 referres to the
opening price on day τo and T3 to the closing price on day τ . The event window [1, 1] therefore
captures the return on the day after the event day τ = 0. We are interested in two events,
membership announcements and the Waxman-Markey Bill. We define the Waxman-Markey
event day, Friday 26 June 2009, as τ = 0 and set the estimation window to 60 trading days from
6Downloaded from Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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T0 = −59 to T1 = 0. The event day τ = 0 is included in this estimation window because of two
reasons: First, the vote took place at 7pm and therefore after the closing of the stock exchanges.
Second, the issue of potential information leakage can be excluded because the outcome of the
vote was extremely narrow and the public outcry thereafter was substantial. The event window
[1, 1] is set narrowly after the event and captures the abnormal returns on day one after the event
with T2 = 1 and T3 = 1. A second, longer windows estimates the returns over [1, 2] until
τ = 2. We do not consider longer event windows because the event precedes the weekend,
which should provide enough time for the news to spread. For the second event in question,
the CCX membership announcments, we extend these narrow windows. It is arguable that the
announcements have experienced prior information leakage. To ease the direct comparison with
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) we choose the following event windows: [0, 1], [−1, 1],
and [−2, 2]. Setting the estimation window to 60 days sets a span from T0 = −62 to T1 = −3.
In turn, the cross-sectional abnormal returns ARiτ in the event window are cumulated from
T2 until T3. This yields the cumulative abnormal returns CARi[T2,T3] =
∑T3
τ=T2
ARiτ . By
averaging the CARs across the observations, n average CARs are obtained: ACAR[T2,T3] =
1
n
∑n
i=1CARi[T2,T3].
The raw returns are useful for economic interpretations. Standardized returns, however, have
been proven to exhibit better statistical properties (Patell, 1976). The scaled abnormal returns
are equal to SARiτ =
ARiτ
S(ARi)
, where the sampling error correction is given by S(ARi) =√
σ2ǫi ∗ [1 + x′t(X ′X)−1xt]. The SARs can be cumulated over time as well: CSARi[T2,T3] =∑T3
τ=T2
SARiτ . The cross secional means of these cumulated standardized abnormal returs are
equal to ASCAR[T2,T3] =
1
n
∑n
i=1CSARi[T2,T3].
In comparison to a conventional t-test or Patell’s test, the test proposed by Boehmer et al.
(1991) given in equation 5 is robust towards event induced variance inflation. Harrington and
Shrider (2013) show that the presence of heterogeneous effects induces event variance and
robust tests against cross-sectional variation in the true abnormal return should therefore be
preferred.
tBMP =
ACSAR · √n
1
n−1
∑n
i=1(CSARi − ACSAR)2
(5)
An issue for the Waxman-Markey sample is clustering since the event affects all sample firms
simultaneously in time. One might therefore question that ǫiτ is independent and identically
distributed. MacKinlay (1997) suggests that clustering can be accommodated in two ways.
Either by a portfolio approach which allows for cross correlation of the abnormal returns, or by
analyzing the abnormal returns without aggregation, e.g. by including a dummy for the event
day. The latter approach has two drawbacks. The test will generally suffer from poor finite
sample properties and has little power against reasonable alternatives. As a remedy, Kolari and
Pynnonen (2010) propose a modification of the test statistic developed by Boehmer et al. (1991)
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that is not affected by clustering. Kolari and Pynnonen’s statistic increases the cross sectional
variance used by Boehmer et al. (1991) by adjusting for the average covariance of the error
terms ρ¯ during the estimation window:
tKP = tBMP
√
1− ρ¯
1 + (n− 1)ρ¯ (6)
We consider the Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) test statistic to be the most appropriate for
our samples. In addition, we make use of the non-parametric generalized rank test proposed in
Kolari et al. (2010) to check the robustness of our parametric tests. We choose the generalized
rank test because it has better properties for testing CARs than the conventional rank test and is
equally well suited for testing single day abnormal returns.
4 Data
In this section, we analyze the announcement effect of the Waxman-Markey bill on both CCX
and CL members. In addition, we investigate whether firms announcing CCX membership
experience positive abnormal returns in an event study. Gans and Hintermann have kindly
provided us with their CCX database and data on their selection process. 7 Their final sample for
the Waxman-Markey event consists of 32 firms. We have compiled roughly the same number.
We start with the same database with 109 members. Of these, 20 are government-affiliated and
are cities, states, or universities. From the remaining 89 observations, we find listings for 57
firms in the US. From these listings we drop seven firms with discontinuous price indices, a sign
of illiquid securities. From the remaining 53 firms, seven are American Depositary Receipts and
three are not major listings or have their book values not denominated in USD. This leaves us
with 40 identified CCX member firms.
We complement our database for the Waxman-Markey event with CL firms and their part-
nership status. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn identify the announcement effect of firms joining
CL (and CERES). In contrast, we identify the effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill on existing CL
members. Our database starts with the listed CL members retrieved from the US Environmental
Protection Agency as of 8 May 2009.8Of the 264 members at this point in time, we focus on
the 19 achiever and 87 setter firms. The other 158 so-called developer firms are by definition
at a very early stage of their membership. We question their status being an advantage in light
of the Waxman-Markey Bill. Indeed, the majority of the developer firms later on opted out of
the program, questioning their motivation and commitment in the first place. We exclude these
7Their CCX sample is from 2010, but we found a document form February 2009 that lists the same CCX mem-
bers: http://www.epa.gov/agstar/documents/workshop09/mccomb.pdf, visited on December
10 2012.
8Obtained through www.archive.org on November 6 2012 via web.archive.org/web/
20090508120744/http://epa.gov/climateleaders/partners/index.html
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developer firms from our analysis because they presumably just started to consider the impact
of their environmental footprint. What is more, this mitigates the concern that these firms might
have joined CL in order to free-ride on the program’s credibility (Darnall and Carmin, 2005).9
Although we lack detailed membership status for the day of the passage of the Waxman-Markey
Bill, Table 5 illustrates the development of the CL program over time. Note in particular the
change in the number of firms across all membership categories from 8 May 2009 to 1 August
2010.
Of the 106 Climate Leaders with setter and achiever status, we identify 65 as being listed on
a US stock market. Among these stocks, there are five illiquid equity return indices and three
ADR listings. This yields an identified sample of 57 CL firms.
The first row in Table 6 lists the identified firms for both programs. For the Waxman-
Markey event samples we conducted a comprehensive analysis of confounding events for an
event window from 26 June 2009 (Friday) through 30 June 2009 (Tuesday). For each firm in
our database, we searched LexisNexis for unexpected announcements that were published in
major US news outlets and which were likely to affect market value during the event window.
The second row in Table 6 lists the number of confounding events for each program. For the 57
CL firms, we identify 16 confounding events, leaving us with a final CL sample of 41 firms. For
the 40 firms in the CCX sample we identify confounding events for nine firms, leaving us with a
final CCX sample of 31 firms. An overview of our final samples for the Waxman-Markey event
are given in Tables 8 and 7. Table 8 lists the final CL sample with the according membership
status and whether the respective firms were charter partners. In addition, the geographic reach
of the emission reductions are shown. Table 7 lists our final CCX sample and indicates charter
member status where applicable. The tables also show that six firms were members in both
programs.
In addition to the Waxman-Markey event samples, we are interested in the announcement
effect for CCX member firms. To determine this sample we start with the same CCX database
and apply the same filters. For the identified firms we search both Google and LexisNexis for
membership announcements, resulting in the sample of 26 firms shown in Table 6. In contrast
to the Waxman-Markey Bill we cumulate abnormal returns for larger event windows due to
potential information leakage. Accordingly, we search for confounding events up to two days
prior and two days after each membership announcement. We find six confounding events and
end up with a sample of 20 firms.
5 Results
This section presents the results of two distinct events. First, we investigate the market reaction
to the Waxman-Markey Bill for our three firm samples described in the last section: A CCX
9urlhttp://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/partners letter 15sep2010.pdf, visited on December 9
2012
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sample, a CL sample, and a pooled sample of all firms combined. Second, we take a look at
the market reaction to membership announcement for CCX firms, offering a direct comparison
to the same reaction towards CL firms in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011). Taken together,
these two events paint a coherent picture of the stock market assessment of the value of mem-
bership in voluntary initiatives, both in critical and less critical times.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
CL & CCX CCX CL
Number of firms 60 31 41
Market value (MV, billion USD)
Mean MV 18.1 17.7 24.1
Median MV 6.7 4.8 11.1
Total sales (billion USD)
Mean sales 20.8 23.2 23.1
Median sales 10.3 9.3 14.4
Market-to-book equity (MEBE)
Mean MEBE 1.9 2.1 2.0
Median MEBE 2.0 1.3 2.3
Fraction of sample firms in TRBC* sector:
Basic Materials 0.18 0.32 0.07
Consumer Cyclicals 0.15 0.06 0.20
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 0.05 0.00 0.07
Financials 0.02 0.03 0.02
Healthcare 0.05 0.03 0.07
Industrials 0.15 0.13 0.17
Technology 0.22 0.13 0.29
Utilities 0.18 0.29 0.10
*TRBC: Thomson Reuters Business Classification.
Market value (MV) of equity 7 trading days before June 29 2009.
The mnemonic of sales is WC01001 and of book equity WC03501
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5.1 Event Returns: Waxman-Markey Bill
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the three samples. The pooled sample comprises 61
firms. On their own, the CCX sample consists of 31 firms and the CL sample 41 contains
firms, meaning that six firms are members in both programs. The distribution of the market
capitalization is positively skewed for the CCX and the CL samples, with CL members being
substantially bigger. The two samples differ in the distribution of their sale volumes as well.
Although CL firms have, on average, the same turnover as CCX firms, their median is higher.
A similar skew is visible in market-to-book numbers. While the average of market-to book
equity is the same in both samples, the medians indicate a proclivity for value firms in the CCX
sample and for growth firms in the CL sample. The two samples differ in the industry exposure
as well. Two economic sectors as classified by the Thomson Reuters Industry Classification are
absent from our samples: Telecommunications and Energy. The other economic sectors are not
equally distributed, neither across the CL nor the CCX sample. For example, the CCX sample
harbors a larger fraction of basic materials and utilities, whereas the CL sample shows a tilt
towards technology firms.
We conduct estimates of abnormal returns for all three samples. To allow for value-relevant
information to distribute and sink in, we conduct analyses for two event windows after the
passage of the bill. Based on the market model given by equation 2 we calculate the cumulated
abnormal returns CAR[1,1] for Monday 30 June only and CAR[1,2] for the two trading days
after the event.
Table 2 presents the abnormal returns and their derivatives according to the 3 factor model,
our baseline specification. The results for the event windows [1,1] and [1,2] are depicted in pan-
els A and B, respectively. Across all samples, the average cumulated abnormal returns (ACAR)
for the short event window are close to 0.5%. The median of the CAR is larger throughout,
most notably for the CCX sample. In contrast, their standardized counterparts (CSAR) are sub-
stantially lower with means close to the medians. Of the three samples, the CCX firms exhibit
the highest standardized returns. The two-sided test statistic by BMP Boehmer et al. (1991)
is highly significant across the board. The null hypothesis of normal returns is well rejected
at the 0.1% significance level for the CCX firms and only slighty more so for the CL firms.
As expected, the more conservative KP p-values according to Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) are
higher (roughly 3% for the CCX firms and 7.6% for CL firms). Finally, the nonparametric gen-
eralized rank test supports the rejection of the null hypothesis of normal returns for the short
event window.
The cumulated abnormal returns over two days in panel B indicate a negative skew for CL
and the pooled sample, whereas the mean and median CARs of the CCX sample are robust
and over 0.7%. This suggests that the market incorporated additional price information on the
second day after the event. The BMP statistic remains significant across the samples for this
longer event window, for the CCX firms once again at the 0.1% level and less so for the CL
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firms at the 10% level. The KP p-values, however, only remain significant for the CCX and
the pooled sample. Put differently, a conservative estimation suggests that the CL firms do not
seem to exhibit abnormal returns when cumulated over two days. Again, the generalized rank
test dovetails with the KP test.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the idea that financial markets believe that
firms engaging in voluntary measures of carbon emission reduction get a head start in preparing
for imminent federal carbon emission legislation. But not all programs encounter equal praise.
Based on the results of the market model, membership in the CCX is considered more beneficial
in light of the Waxman-Markey Bill compared to membership in the CL program.
All the same, the heterogeneous sector distributions for the CCX and CL firms give pause.
The empirical evidence listed in Section 2 suggests that some sectors might experience specific
shocks when faced with a carbon cap-and-trade system, depending on their cost exposure. In-
deed, the CL and CCX firms are not readily comparable in terms of sector distribution. The
results in Table 2 are based on the 3 factor model, which benchmarks a firm’s returns against
the market return and the two Fama-French risk factors SMB and HML. As such, the results are
prone to industry-specific effects.
It seems plausible that the Waxman-Markey Bill had distinct effects in different industries.
In order to isolate the CCX and CLmembership effect, we proceed with controlling for industry-
specific confoundings by extending the market model with both economic and, to reach an even
deeper level, business sector returns. . In a first step, we incorporate industry return factors from
10 economic sectors. More precisely, for each security i in sector j we add to the market model
the economic sector return j as defined in equation 3. Table 9 in the appendix summarizes the
results of this extension. It turns out that economic sector returns explain a substantial part of the
observed positive effects. By any measure of statistical significance and for both event windows,
the abnormal returns of the pooled sample are no longer different from zero. The two samples on
their own present a more nuanced picture. In the previous analysis, the CL sample only showed
significant returns for the short event window. This significance disappears with the inclusion
of industry-specific effects. The CCX sample, on the other hand, keeps showing (slightly less)
significant abnormal returns, in particular for the longer event window. In this window, the
CARs and CSARS for the CCX firms are somewhat reduced by introducing industry-specific
controls. In sum, the new results indicate that positive sectoral effects have been at work, much
more so for the CL than for the CCX sample. The effect for the CCX firms dilutes in the pooled
sample.
To further check the robustness of these results, we extend the market model by adding to
each security i in business sector γ the business sector return γ. In contrast to 10 economic
sectors, we are thus now able to differentiate more subtly by controlling for 25 business sectors.
The results for our third and most strict specification, which is formally given by equation 4,
are presented in Table 3. The results reinforce the trend set by the previous specification with
10 economic sectors. In addition to the CL sample, the CCX sample starts losing some of its
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Table 2: 3 factor model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR 0.450 0.437 0.476
CAR Median 0.534 0.740 0.490
ACSAR 0.264 0.324 0.230
CSAR Median 0.241 0.303 0.220
BMP t-statistic 3.403 2.960 2.533
BMP p-val 0.001 0.006 0.015
KP t-statistic 2.298 2.280 1.820
KP p-val 0.025 0.030 0.076
GRank Test 2.745 2.605 2.248
GRank p-val 0.008 0.012 0.028
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.310 0.789 0.347
CAR Median 0.734 0.766 0.723
ACSAR 0.375 0.540 0.275
CSAR Median 0.393 0.503 0.503
BMP t-statistic 2.937 3.087 1.924
BMP p-val 0.005 0.004 0.061
KP t-statistic 1.983 2.378 1.383
KP p-val 0.052 0.024 0.174
GRank Test 2.105 2.354 1.619
GRank p-val 0.040 0.022 0.111
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to
26jun2009. Event window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day
26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on 26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The
BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976) and
robust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen,
2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our
samples the average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx =
0.020, ρ¯ccx = 0.022 , ρ¯cl = 0.023 . The non-parametric GRank test is the
generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and Pynno¨nen
(2010a.)
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verve. While there remains evidence of abnormal returns for the longer event window in panel
B, controlling for business sectors renders the statistical significance of abnormal returns in the
short event window non-significant.
Let us take a closer look at the longer event window for the CCX sample in Table 3. The
CARs are positively skewed, with a substantially higher mean than median value. This holds
true for the standardized CARs as well. The previous specifications have shown consistently
lower p-values for the BMP test in comparison to the KP test. This order has now switched.
While the BMP test statistic implies a p-value above the 10% level, the stricter KP p-value
retains statistical significance at this level. This switch can be explained by the average cor-
relation of the abnormal returns ρ¯, which has become slightly negative. The significance of
the KP p-value is supported by the generalized rank test. The analysis suggests that business
sector effects explain an additional part of the positive abnormal returns. Further indication that
controlling for sectoral effects has increased the explanatory power is reflected by the changes
in correlation of the abnormal returns ρ¯ (see the footnotes in the according tables). This value
decreases steadily with increasingly detailed model specification and tends to converge towards
zero. In sum, CCX firms seem to have profited from the threat of regulation in addition to being
overrepresented in favorable sectors.
5.2 Event Returns: CCX membership announcement
As the second event, we investigate the market reaction to CCX membership announcements.
The sample consists of 20 firms announcing their engagement, ranging from the founding mem-
bers in 2003 up to the last announcements in 2008. Industry-specific effects are less of a concern
in this setting. While the Waxman-Markey Bill has shown to have had a sudden and highly fo-
cused impact on entire industry sectors at one point in time, mere membership announcements
should hardly be confounded by industry-wide effects. Moreover, they are scattered over several
years. In contrast to the Waxman-Markey Bill, however, information leakage poses a potential
problem. To address the possibility that insider information affected the stock price before the
firms’ public statements, we extend the event window symmetrically around the announcement
dates. In addition to calculating the cumulated abnormal returns over the short window [0,1],
we add two longer windows, [-1,1] and [-2,2] to ease the comparison with Fisher-Vanden and
Thorburn.
Table 4 presents the abnormal return estimates for CCX membership announcement. Over
the short window, both the ACAR and the ACSAR are slightly positive. This changes when
expanding the event windows, with the longest window exhibiting negative returns across the
board. However, none of the results show a statistically significant pattern. All test statistics are
well below significance levels and cannot reject the null hypothesis of normal returns in light
of the membership announcements. In yet other words, the market was seemingly indifferent
to the firms’ sudden voluntary engagement in the CCX. Our results qualify the findings in Gans
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Table 3: 4 factor business sector model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR -0.196 -0.260 -0.063
CAR Median -0.109 -0.042 -0.071
ACSAR 0.029 0.082 0.021
CSAR Median -0.069 -0.036 -0.039
BMP t-statistic 0.345 0.694 0.213
BMP p-val 0.731 0.493 0.832
KP t-statistic 0.345 0.712 0.199
KP p-val 0.731 0.482 0.844
GRank Test 0.516 0.644 0.577
GRank p-val 0.608 0.522 0.566
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.259 0.684 0.270
CAR Median -0.055 0.170 0.096
ACSAR 0.127 0.303 0.074
CSAR Median -0.016 0.063 0.046
BMP t-statistic 0.962 1.679 0.507
BMP p-val 0.340 0.103 0.615
KP t-statistic 0.964 1.722 0.472
KP p-val 0.339 0.095 0.639
GRank Test 1.005 1.674 0.815
GRank p-val 0.319 0.100 0.419
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to
26jun2009. Event window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day
26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on 26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The
BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976) and ro-
bust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen, 2010)
is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our sam-
ples the average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx = -0.000,
ρ¯ccx = -0.002 , ρ¯cl = 0.004 . The non-parametric GRank test is the
generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and Pynno¨nen
(2010a.)
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and Hintermann, where a positive market reaction was concluded. Nevertheless, CCX firms
seem to provoke a different market reaction upon membership announcement than CL firms do.
In Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, newly announced membership engagement in the CL initiative
was vigorously punished with negative abnormal returns.
Table 4: 3 event windows based on the 3 factor model
[0,1] [-1,1] [-2,2]
ACAR 0.150 -0.213 -0.513
CAR Median 0.210 -0.001 -0.310
ACSAR 0.185 0.168 -0.024
CSAR Median 0.135 -0.013 -0.117
Patell t-statistic 0.813 0.738 -0.107
Patell p-val 0.420 0.464 0.915
BMP t-statistic 0.517 0.319 -0.043
BMP p-val 0.607 0.751 0.966
KP t-statistic 0.455 0.281 -0.038
KP p-val 0.651 0.780 0.970
GRank Test 0.897 0.454 0.011
GRank p-val 0.374 0.651 0.991
Nr. of Observations 20 20 20
CAR & CSAR in %. The 3 factor model parameters are estimated during 59. The BMP
test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976), robust to event induced vari-
ance. Kolary & Pyo¨nnen (2010) (KP) extend the BMP test, adjusting for cross sectional
correlation. The average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ in our sample is ρ¯ = 0.015
The GRank test is the generalized rank test for cumulated abnormal returns from Kolari
and Pyonnen (2010a)
6 Conclusion
When does it pay to be green? This paper studies two events to answer this question. First,
we examine the immediate effect of the Waxman-Markey Bill on stock prices for members of
two voluntary but binding US environmental initiatives, Climate Leaders (CL) and the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX). This bill intended to establish a mandated carbon market in the US
and unexpectedly passed the vote in the House of Representatives in June 2009, temporarily
inducing a credible economic threat in the form of unforeseen costs in the short run. In the
second event study, we investigate the market reaction to membership announcements to the
CCX.
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Our event studies employ the market model augmented by the Fama-French factors (Fama
and French, 1992, 1993). In our baseline specification, the reaction to the Waxman-Markey Bill
indicates positive abnormal returns for both the CL and the CCX firm samples. However, the
existing literature stresses that industry effects may play a role in the attributed impact on firm
level. With respect to the Waxman-Markey event in particular, the implementation of the bill
would likely have had specific impacts on different industries. For this reason, we isolate the
membership effect in a voluntary climate initiative by extending the basic model specification
by economic and, on a deeper level, business sector returns. Doing so puts the positive effects
into perspective. By and large, members of the Chicago Climate Exchange seemed to profit
from the Waxman-Markey Bill despite the confounding industry effects. This finding is in
line with Gans and Hintermann (2013), but the observed industry effects dampen the attributed
market reaction to CCX membership. On the other hand, the industry effects fully account for
the positive returns for the Climate Leaders.
In a second event study, we investigate the market reaction towards membership announce-
ment. In their event study, Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn found significant negative effects when
new CL member announced their engagement. In direct comparison to the immediate nega-
tive reaction towards the CL announcements in Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn’s event study, how
do new CCX members fare? Our results for CCX membership announcement cannot reject a
neutral market reaction and qualifies the conclusions of previous findings, where Gans and Hin-
termann concluded a positve reaction for CCX announcements. We attribute the distinct results
in spite of the same event to the methodological differences. Our observed market reaction sug-
gests that the market does not regard the CCX engagement as a detrimental venture. One could
argue that the engagement was in line with the market’s expectation of the firms’ strategies.
Obviously, both initiatives entail considerable costs for the firms in the short run. The reaction
to the membership announcements suggest that the perceived advantages of membership only
outweigh these costs in case of the engagement in the CCX. There only seemed good reason to
join the CCX, not the CL initiative.
Taken together, the market reaction in light of the two events paint a consistent picture of the
perceived value of membership in the two initiatives. The significant abnormal returns for the
Chicago Climate Exchange members during the passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill are likely
to be explained by the fact that this program effectively mirrored the workings of a regulatory
cap-and-trade system as intended by the bill. Indeed, the CCX can plausibly be considered
a blueprint for the emission trading system proposed in the bill. The positive reaction distin-
guishes the Chicago Climate Exchange from the Climate Leaders, who acquired firm internal
knowledge about how to implement an emission management system and how to identify and
pursue emission reduction opportunities. Crucially, the Climate Leaders did not profit from
participating in an active carbon market, gaining trading experience and knowledge directly ap-
plicable in the foreseen cap-and-trade system. The indifferent market reaction for the Climate
Leaders during the passage of the bill is in line with the preparation argument. These results are
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also consistent with the view that firms do not only join to signal a credible commitment to go
green, but gain actual experience which is helpful in light of looming regulation.
We caution to claim external validity for our results. Membership in these initiatives is
voluntary and therefore endogenous. Even though we control for firm characteristics in our
estimations, we can not control for variables like firm strategy or product differentiation. We
would expect firms with higher membership payoffs to be more likely to join. By the same
token, it seems reasonable that the observed market reaction for members establishes a upper
bound when thinking about a contractual membership of non-member firms. On the other
hand, one might argue that the Waxman-Markey event was a regulatory event and therefore
less dichotomous as other events, the observed market reaction rather establishes a lower bound
effect.
Based on our results of the two examined events we contend that voluntary initiative alone
are clearly not enough to move the whole economy to a lower carbon intensity. But they might
complement regulatory regimes. The results of this paper inform about the interaction of volun-
tary program design and regulation. Interestingly enough, even the Bush administration itself,
under which the Climate Leaders program was initiated, did not really believe in the effec-
tiveness of purely voluntary efforts. The New York Times wrote on January 20 2003 that
administration officials were collecting written promises from industries to curb greenhouse
gas emissions. “White House officials, insisting on concrete commitments measured in tons of
gases, have rejected written offers from some industry groups to take nonspecific actions, sev-
eral industry officials said.... Opponents of regulation have criticized the administration’s effort
as a mandatory program disguised as a voluntary one.”
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7 Tables
Table 5: Climate Leader Membership Development
Date # Firms Achievers Setters Developers
28.03.2008 162 11 69 82
21.05.2008 172 11 69 92
03.01.2009 249 18 85 146
08.05.2009 264 19 87 158
01.08.2010 * 191 26 93 72
13.02.2011 183 32 100 51
* Retrieved on September 20 2012 from:
http://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/documents/directory.pdf
All other dates are from lists as retrieved from www.archive.org
Table 6: Nr. of firms in samples
Waxman-Marekey event Membership announcement
CL&CCX CCX CL CCX
Identified∗ 84 40 57 26
Confounding events 24 9 16 6
Resulting sample 60 31 41 20
∗ Identified firms without illiquid firms and ADRs.
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Table 7: Chicago Climate Exchange firms (CCX) and event samples
Firm name Sample membership* Charter member
Abbott Laboratories MA
Agrium U.S. Inc. W&M
Alliant Energy Corporate Services Inc. W&M
American Electric Power MA W&M charter member
Avista Corporation MA W&M
Bank of America Corporation W&M
Baxter International Inc. MA W&M charter member
Boise Paper Holdings, LLC MA W&M
CLECO Corporation W&M
Central Vermont Public Service MA W&M
Dow Corning W&M
DTE Energy Inc MA W&M
DuPont W&M charter member
Eastman Kodak Company W&M
FMC Corporation W&M
Ford Motor Company W&M charter member
Genon Energy Inco. MA
Green Mnt.Power Corp. MA
Intel Corporation MA W&M
Interface, Inc. MA W&M
IBM MA W&M
International Paper W&M charter member
Knoll, Inc. MA W&M
MeadWestvaco Corp. MA W&M charter member
Mirant Corporation W&M
Motorola, Inc. W&M charter member
Neenah Paper Incorporated MA W&M
Nrg Energy Inco. MA
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. W&M
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC W&M
Puget Energy Inco. MA
Safeway Incorporated MA
Steelcase Inc. W&M
TECO Energy, Inc. W&M
Temple-Inland Inc MA W&M charter member
United Technologies Corporation W&M
Waste Management, Inc. MA W&M charter member
Sample membership*: - W&M; Waxman-Markey event sample
- MA; Membership Announcement sample.
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Table 8: Sample of Climate Leader firms (CL) for Waxman-Markey event
Firm name CL status* Charter partner Reduction region
3M achievers U.S. GHG
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. achievers charter partner global GHG
Agilent Technologies setters global GHG
American Electric Power achievers U.S. GHG
Applied Materials, Inc. setters global GHG
Bank of America Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Baxter International Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Best Buy Co., Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Calpine setters U.S. GHG
Campbell Soup Company setters U.S. GHG
Caterpillar Inc. achievers global GHG
Cisco Systems, Inc. setters global GHG
Cummins Inc. setters global GHG
Dell Inc. setters global GHG
DuPont Company setters global GHG
Eastman Kodak Company setters charter partner global GHG
Ecolab, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
EMC Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Fairchild Semiconductor setters U.S. GHG
Hasbro, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
Intel Corporation setters global GHG
Interface, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
IBM Corporation achievers charter partner global GHG
International Paper setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Johnson Controls, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
LSI Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Marriott International, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Merck & Co., Inc. setters global GHG
Millipore Corporation setters global GHG
Coors Brewing Company setters U.S. GHG
FPL Group, Inc. achievers charter partner U.S. GHG
NVIDIA Corporation setters U.S. GHG
Owens Corning setters U.S. GHG
PepsiCo setters U.S. GHG
PPG Industries, Inc. setters global GHG
PSEG setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Staples, Inc. setters charter partner U.S. GHG
Steelcase Inc. setters U.S. GHG
Gap, Inc. setters U.S. GHG
United Technologies Corporation achievers global GHG
Xerox Corporation achievers global GHG
CL status*: Status of Climate Leader member with regard to emission
reduction pledge.
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Table 9: 4 factor economic sector model
CL&CCX CCX CL
Panel A: event window[1,1]
ACAR -0.047 0.102 -0.082
CAR Median 0.027 0.181 -0.004
ACSAR 0.073 0.204 0.011
CSAR Median 0.018 0.114 -0.002
BMP t-statistic 0.896 1.829 0.118
BMP p-val 0.374 0.077 0.907
KP t-statistic 0.808 1.796 0.100
KP p-val 0.422 0.082 0.920
GRank Test 1.173 1.903 0.513
GRank p-val 0.245 0.062 0.610
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
Panel B: event window[1,2]
ACAR 0.276 0.717 0.294
CAR Median 0.465 0.804 0.380
ACSAR 0.185 0.436 0.063
CSAR Median 0.197 0.403 0.160
BMP t-statistic 1.423 2.479 0.432
BMP p-val 0.160 0.019 0.668
KP t-statistic 1.283 2.435 0.367
KP p-val 0.204 0.021 0.715
GRank Test 1.442 2.247 0.664
GRank p-val 0.155 0.028 0.509
Nr. of Observations 60 31 41
CAR & CSAR in %. 60 days estimation window from 02apr2009 to
26jun2009. Event window[1,1] captures the abnormal returns on day
26jun2009 and event window[1,2] on 26jun2009 and 30jun2009. The
BMP test (Boehmer et al. 1991) is an extension of Patell (1976) and
robust to event induced variance. The KP test (Kolary & Pynno¨nen,
2010) is adjusting the BMP test for cross sectional correlation. In our
samples the average correlation of abnormal returns ρ¯ is: ρ¯cl&ccx =
0.004, ρ¯ccx = 0.001 , ρ¯cl = 0.009 . The non-parametric GRank test is the
generalized rank test for cumulated returns from Kolari and Pynno¨nen
(2010a.)
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